Four years into the war, millions of Ukrainians remain displaced across Europe. By April 2026 roughly 4.4\u202fmillion non-EU nationals (mostly Ukrainians) were under the EU\u2019s Temporary Protection scheme, and some 6.8\u202fmillion Ukrainians were displaced abroad. Initially managed as an emergency, the focus has shifted to longer-term integration. Local and regional authorities now confront sustained demands on housing, education, health, labour-market and social services, while gearing up for the eventual transition to residence status or return. Evidence from official sources highlights continued high aspirations to return home (war permitting), but persistent obstacles \u2013 notably damaged housing, employment gaps and security concerns \u2013 slow returns.\u00a0 Local initiatives (\u201cintegration hubs\u201d, multilingual services, volunteer networks) and multi-level cooperation have helped. Yet challenges remain: uneven reception capacity, fiscal strain on municipalities, and risks of social exclusion, especially for vulnerable groups. To address this, we recommend maintaining coordinated TP regimes, easing the TP-to-residency transition, boosting funding for LRAs (including earmarked EU\/National funds), and scaling up proven local practices (e.g. community integration centres). Protecting rights and supporting cohesion \u2013 through anti-discrimination measures, trauma-informed care and public information \u2013 is essential.\u00a0 This brief draws on recent EU, UNHCR, OECD, FRA, and Council of Europe analyses, and highlights illustrative cases (with sources) to guide policy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
The war-induced displacement remains unprecedented: Europe hosts the largest refugee influx since WW2 (OECD, 2026). As of early 2026, 4.4\u202fmillion Ukrainian refugees were under TP in the EU (plus sizeable flows in non-EU countries). Germany (\u22481.28\u202fM), Poland (\u22480.97\u202fM), and Czechia (\u22480.38\u202fM) alone host the majority. TP status has been extended (currently to 4\u202fMar\u202f2027, and proposals exist to extend to 2028). About 4.5\u202fmillion were under TP by end-2025. Recognition of Ukrainian asylum claims is high in some countries (e.g. ~90% in Estonia\/France) but low in others (3% in Germany in 2025), reflecting shifting policies. Surveys indicate mixed intentions: roughly one-third want to return to Ukraine, one-third prefer to stay, and one-quarter are undecided. The majority planned to return eventually, but the ongoing war prevents short-term returns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Reception capacity and public services vary widely. Many refugees rely on private accommodation (60% in FRA survey), often at cost and overcrowded (shared kitchens\/bathrooms, lack of study space for children). Municipalities face housing shortages: rents and home prices have surged in key cities (e.g. Vilnius saw +24% price rise in early 2022). In some places (e.g. Prague in May 2022), makeshift camps were opened due to acute demand. Education uptake lags: <50% of school-age children continued education in the host country, largely due to language barriers. Labour-market absorption is uneven: about two-thirds of pre-war workers found jobs, but overall two-thirds of working-age refugees remained unemployed, hindered by language, childcare, and recognition issues. Psychosocial distress is high \u2013 ~50% of adults often feel depressed and nearly all experienced war-related trauma \u2013 straining health and social support systems. <\/p>\n\n\n\n