{"id":1759,"date":"2021-06-21T20:41:28","date_gmt":"2021-06-21T20:41:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/?p=1759"},"modified":"2024-03-30T17:30:31","modified_gmt":"2024-03-30T17:30:31","slug":"glorious-history-dangerous-present-and-a-utopian-future-a-comparative-discourse-analysis-of-the-front-national-and-akp","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/glorious-history-dangerous-present-and-a-utopian-future-a-comparative-discourse-analysis-of-the-front-national-and-akp\/","title":{"rendered":"Glorious history, dangerous present and a utopian future: a comparative discourse analysis of the Front National and AKP"},"content":{"rendered":"

\"Il y a une r\u00e9volution en cours, une r\u00e9volution des nations, en fait, c'est le grand retour des nations, et le grand retour du peuple et de la d\u00e9mocratie. \"<\/em>1<\/sup>\u00a0<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Cette d\u00e9claration \u00e9tonnante de Marine Le Pen, leader du parti d'extr\u00eame droite fran\u00e7ais Front national (FN), r\u00e9sume de mani\u00e8re pointue la doctrine politique de ces partis qui ont combin\u00e9 le populisme (le\u00a0pure\u00a0people<\/em>\u00a0contre\u00a0les \u00e9lites<\/em>) et le nationalisme (\u00a0les<\/em>\u00a0autochtones<\/em>\u00a0contre\u00a0autres<\/em>) for their absolute success, and the extremity of this phenomenon that is gaining ground across various political systems, particularly those in Europe. The convergence of nationalism in the populist discourse established a new strain of ethno-cultural nationalism, an exclusionary conception of \u2018national identity\u2019 and an anti-European Union (EU)\/anti-globalisation agenda that envisages the contemporary nation under danger and proposes to return the nation to its past glory. On that note, the adaptation of a populist nationalist nexus\u00a0in the\u00a0far-right political parties has\u00a0rather become an inherently reactionary movement challenging\u00a0the established norms of liberalism, democracy, equality and freedom.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This\u00a0article\u00a0takes issue with the political discourse of Marine Le Pen, the leader of the French Front National and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, leader of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP). Both parties have achieved substantial political power in the recent years and have become powerful figures of far-right politics. While Le Pen\u2019s populist and nationalist stand has shown the way to other far-right political parties across Europe, Erdogan\u2019s discourse has also received much appreciation from Middle Eastern countries and opposition from Europe. The success of Le Pen\u00a0and Erdogan has become a growing concern across European institutions and governments. Hence, both parties have individually become much analysed prominent subjects in the studies of far-right populism. This\u00a0article\u00a0will compare and contrast the two groups on the basis of their common characteristics of anti-elitism, nationalism\/nativism\u00a0and\u00a0anti-multiculturalism (Kaya et al, 2020).\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n

Le d\u00e9veloppement du populisme en Turquie sous l'AKP\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

During the Kemalist authoritarianism, being a legitimate member of the political community depended on accepting the cultural and\u00a0political\u00a0meanings of Turkishness introduced by Ataturk (Ozpek and Yasar, 2017), which thoroughly followed the Western European doctrine of secularism. The age of Kemalism saw Turkish socio-political and public clearing of any religious identity and ideology, whether this would be some clothing, such as a hijab, or reading a religious book within the public space. As Keyman writes, Kemalism formulated an aggressive French style of secularism, aimed to reduce Islam as a personal faith (2008). This exclusionary agenda against a sub-section of the population resulted in the suppression of the religious Turks, whom had been the \u2018losers\u2019 of the Kemalist regime.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Consequently, within the first years of AKP, Erdogan successfully capitalised on the anti-establishment feelings of the religious population and openly accused the longitudinal Kemalist regime of failing to represent the interests of the religious masses and for being oppressive, despotic, homogenising and top-down (Akdogan, 2004). By effectively tapping into the feelings of the religious Turks, AKP gradually gained popular vote and replaced the once Kemalist political and legal institutions, media and journalism as well as academia with a Turkish-Islamic synthesis (Ozpek and Yasar, 2017). Inevitably, the antagonistic relationship within the population was re-defined. The polarisation that once was between privileged Turks and the ordinary people, shifted into a polarisation between those that support Ottomanism, Islamic revival and conservative\u00a0national values and those that reject this identity and advocate Western institutions and secularism\u00a0(Yabanci, 2016).\u00a0<\/strong>Thus,\u00a0Erdogan\u2019s AKP displays its populist rhetoric through a historical nostalgia of the Ottomans, a new identity that is created along the lines of Ottoman traditions, and a discontent and opposition towards internal \u2018enemies\u2019 that support Western ideologies, and external enemies in the West, such as the EU institutions.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0Le populisme fran\u00e7ais : Le cas du Front national\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

For over forty years, the\u00a0FN\u00a0advocated a simplistic \u2018master frame\u2019 (Benford and Snow, 2000) that capitalised on anti-immigration, anti-establishment, anti-Semitism, anti-Europeanism and carried a Christian interpretation of the French society\u00a0and identity.\u00a0In 2011, Le Pen announced that her first task was to break the FN from its radical ideology and to de-demonise the party as a mainstream that welcomes all ideas and peoples (Symons, 2017). While Le Pen has managed to soften the party\u2019s image by abolishing racism and anti-Semitic discourse, the party still remains exclusionary and ethnocentric. As Symons writes, they remain faithful to the values of Jean Marie Le Pen (ibid). Albeit, by demonstrating nationalist ideologies in a populist framework, Le Pen successfully shifted the empty-hearted elements of anti-Europeanism, anti-establishment and anti-immigration into powerful agendas by visualising Europe, globalisation, immigrants and the corrupt establishment as constituting significant threats to the sovereignty and identity of the French people, the homogenous and pure community inside the nation.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

The most visible distinction, however, has been the replacement of racism and anti-Semitic claims to an ethnocentric worldview that rather excludes on the basis of culture, religion, tradition and lifestyle. Through the nostalgia of a mythical French history, Le Pen\u2019s discourse reincarnates the French identity on the basis of\u00a0liberty, secularism and freedom.\u00a0On the opposite end of these values, she places the \u2018alienated Muslim\u2019 (Mondon, 2014) whose religion, culture and identity endangers these French values.\u00a0As a result, Le Pen\u2019s discourse manifests\u00a0\u2018Muslims\u2019 living on\u00a0French soil as causing a French identity split, reducing the Frenchness of the imagined national community\u00a0(Seitz, 2020).\u00a0The EU and globalisation on the other hand, is blamed for its technocratic nature, incompetency against terrorism, its multiculturalism and immigration laws that causes the spread of \u2018Islamic Fundamentalism\u2019.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La nostalgie historique\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

La nostalgie historique est devenue un \u00e9l\u00e9ment fondamental du discours de l'AKP et du FN, car elle g\u00e9n\u00e8re le besoin m\u00eame de soigner le sentiment de perte r\u00e9sultant de la disparition des notions \u00e9tablies de nation, d'identit\u00e9 et de culture (Gest et al, 2017). Une construction tr\u00e8s explicite dans le discours d'Erdogan a \u00e9t\u00e9 la nostalgie historique de l'Empire ottoman et de son h\u00e9ritage islamique. L'AKP a \u00e9t\u00e9 le premier parti dans l'histoire de la R\u00e9publique turque \u00e0 embrasser les Ottomans et m\u00eame \u00e0 s'identifier comme porteur de l'h\u00e9ritage de l'Empire ottoman :\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0L'AKP est Malazgird, celui qui prend la suite du sultan Alp Arslan. L'AKP est l'Empire seldjoukide. L'AKP est l'Ottoman, celui qui suit nos grands anc\u00eatres, celui qui h\u00e9rite de la foi du sultan Mehmet. L'AKP est le d\u00e9fenseur d'Abdul Hamid II, qui a essay\u00e9 de prot\u00e9ger et de d\u00e9velopper\u00a0notre<\/em>\u00a0nation \u00e0 une \u00e9poque o\u00f9 le monde \u00e9tait d\u00e9stabilis\u00e9 et chaotique. (Erdogan, 2018)\u00a0<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Dans l'extrait ci-dessus, Erdogan compare l'AKP aux anciens empires turcs musulmans, les Seldjoukides, les Ottomans et leurs dirigeants. La composition de l'AKP comme la \"bataille de Malazgird\", la victoire des Seldjoukides contre la grande arm\u00e9e grecque-chr\u00e9tienne byzantine, souligne l'opposition historique entre le monde musulman et le monde chr\u00e9tien et positionne l'AKP comme la continuation de cette lutte pour l'Islam. Le discours d'Erdogan dessine une conception dualiste des Ottomans : tout en les d\u00e9crivant comme puissants, \u00e0 l'aide de Fatih Sultan Mehmet, conqu\u00e9rant de Constantinople, il les pr\u00e9sente \u00e9galement comme les victimes d'une crise ext\u00e9rieure, leur effondrement \u00e9tant attribu\u00e9 \u00e0 un monde\"instable\"<\/em>\u00a0et\u00a0\"chaotique\"<\/em>\u00a0world, instead of their bankruptcy and the rapid loss of political power. Thus, Erdogan compares the present AKP to a mythical history of the Ottomans, by doing so, he draws a\u00a0connection between his struggles in upholding the nation and the people against the enemies, to the similar struggles and enemies of the Ottoman Sultans.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Le discours de Le Pen embrasse \u00e9galement la puissance de l'Empire fran\u00e7ais, en comparaison avec les faiblesses de la France contemporaine :\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0 Quand les Fran\u00e7ais ont oubli\u00e9 leur propre valeur, il faut voir la vitalit\u00e9 du cin\u00e9ma qu\u00e9b\u00e9cois, de la litt\u00e9rature francophone en Afrique. Je crois que la France peut \u00e0 nouveau devenir plus grande. (Le Pen, 2016)\u00a0\u00a0<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

L'extrait ci-dessus constitue le discours tr\u00e8s traditionnel des partis populistes nationaux, le pass\u00e9 mythique, le pr\u00e9sent probl\u00e9matique et un futur utopique de la nation. Le Pen encadre l'Empire fran\u00e7ais comme puissant, notamment sous l'aspect de la diffusion de la langue fran\u00e7aise dans les colonies. La France contemporaine, cependant, est pr\u00e9sent\u00e9e comme oubliant son identit\u00e9 et son histoire. Cette construction de l'Empire fran\u00e7ais comme glorieux, et de la France contemporaine comme mis\u00e9rable, place l'Empire fran\u00e7ais et la France comme membre de l'UE dans des cat\u00e9gories oppos\u00e9es et, ce faisant, elle oppose \u00e9galement le Fran\u00e7ais de souche qui souhaite rendre \u00e0 la nation sa puissance pass\u00e9e, \u00e0 \"l'autre\" qui s'associe \u00e0 l'identit\u00e9 europ\u00e9enne sur l'identit\u00e9 nationale fran\u00e7aise.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Le cas de l'identit\u00e9\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/em>\u00a0<\/h4>\n\n\n\n

La construction d'une identit\u00e9 nationale excluante s'appuie sur des valeurs et des attributs importants mis en \u00e9vidence par la nostalgie historique de la nation. Le cadre de l'identit\u00e9 turque d\u00e9fini par Erdogan englobe la croyance islamique de l'Empire ottoman comme l'appartenance nationale d\u00e9terminante de la Turquie contemporaine :\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Vous<\/em>\u00a0ne pourrez pas diviser notre pays, vous ne pourrez pas d\u00e9truire notre \u00c9tat,\u00a0vous<\/em>\u00a0ne pourrez pas faire taire notre azan, parce que\u00a0nous<\/em>\u00a0sommes la Turquie\u00a0nous<\/em>\u00a0nous sommes le peuple turc,\u00a0nous<\/em>\u00a0nous sommes musulmans. (Erdogan, 2018)\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0L'extrait ci-dessus est un exemple impeccable de l'antagonisme entre le peuple turc et l'\u00e9lite, et la couche \u00e9tendue que le nationalisme ajoute \u00e0 cet antagonisme, le peuple turc en tant que musulman contre les autres. L'utilisation binaire par Erdogan des pronoms\u00a0\" nous \"\u00a0<\/em>contre\u00a0\" vous \"\u00a0<\/em>pronouns places two entities in oppositional\u00a0categories vis-\u00e0-vis one another (Aydin-Duzgit, 2016). He firstly constructs Turkey under attack by an external enemy that is\u00a0\" divise \"\u00a0<\/em>le\u00a0\" pays \",\u00a0<\/em>cette affirmation place la Turquie dans une opposition hostile \u00e0 l'Europe et reconna\u00eet la diff\u00e9renciation id\u00e9ologique de la Turquie par rapport \u00e0 l'Occident. Deuxi\u00e8mement, l'identit\u00e9 nationale est d\u00e9finie sur un axe haut-bas, comme dans les \u00e9tudes sur le populisme, le \"peuple turc\" est oppos\u00e9 \u00e0 un\u00a0\"devlet\" (\u00c9tat) corrompu.<\/em>\u00a0Troisi\u00e8mement, l'identit\u00e9 du \"peuple turc\" est expliqu\u00e9e par le nativisme et le nationalisme, et la turcit\u00e9 devient une identit\u00e9 d'exclusion qui compose l'identification \"musulmane\".\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

La construction de l'identit\u00e9 dans le discours de Le Pen met \u00e9galement l'accent sur les valeurs fran\u00e7aises qui ont \u00e9t\u00e9 forg\u00e9es \u00e0 travers le pass\u00e9 mythique de la nation :\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0Nous<\/em>\u00a0, Fran\u00e7ais, sommes profond\u00e9ment attach\u00e9s \u00e0\u00a0notre<\/em>\u00a0notre la\u00efcit\u00e9, \u00e0\u00a0notre<\/em>\u00a0notre souverainet\u00e9, \u00e0\u00a0notre<\/em>\u00a0notre ind\u00e9pendance\u00a0notre<\/em>\u00a0, \u00e0 nos valeurs,\u00a0notre\u00a0<\/em>\u00e0 notre art de vivre. (Le Pen, 2015)\u00a0<\/p><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n

Dans l'extrait ci-dessus, Le Pen propose les caract\u00e9ristiques de l'identit\u00e9 nationale fran\u00e7aise. L'utilisation de\u00a0\" nous \"<\/em>\u00a0et\u00a0\"nous\"\u00a0<\/em>et \"notre\" g\u00e9n\u00e8re le discours populiste typique, les caract\u00e9ristiques attribu\u00e9es \u00e0 ce pronom, cependant, propose la convergence du nationalisme dans le discours populiste. Le Pen construit\u00a0\" nous \"\u00a0<\/em>et\u00a0\"nous\"\u00a0<\/em>as\u00a0the in-group of the population, who constitutes the fundamental values of Frenchness defined by secularism, cultural values and a certain way of living. As the French psychologist Marc Lipiansky writes, a national character is not simply a sum of individual characters, but it is a general way of feeling, thinking and wanting (1991). Hence, Le Pen\u2019s construction of the exclusionary French identity is very vague and narrow, it demands one to fully integrate themselves into the French social and cultural life, replacing all ethnic and cultural authenticity.\u00a0 This initiates that those who perceive a different lifestyle, clothing, food and faith are inherently antagonistic to the French national identity. The French people are also manifested as having an attachment to\u00a0la souverainet\u00e9\u00a0<\/em>et\u00a0et \u00e0 l'ind\u00e9pendance,\u00a0<\/em>ce qui construit la relation conflictuelle entre le peuple fran\u00e7ais et l'establishment qui suit les r\u00e8glements de l'UE, ainsi que l'UE qui a longtemps \u00e9t\u00e9 accus\u00e9e de r\u00e9duire le pouvoir national.\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

This\u00a0article\u00a0aimed to shed light on\u00a0la fa\u00e7on\u00a0<\/em>the far-right populist leaders have framed and created historical nostalgia\u00a0and\u00a0an exclusionary national identity through the convergence of nationalism in their populist discourses. This\u00a0article\u00a0found that the narrative of the pure \u2018people\u2019 as defined in populism, became exceptionally stronger when the leaders, Le Pen and Erdogan combined nationalism into their discourse, constructing \u2018the people\u2019 as both an opposition to the establishment and the elite, but also opposing the \u2018people\u2019 as a national community against the ethnoculturally and ideologically \u2018other\u2019. The construction of a historical nostalgia in the discourse of Le Pen and Erdogan focuses on a mythical conceptualisation of the past Ottoman and French Empires, solely focusing on the identity and values these Empires possessed. By doing so, this\u00a0article\u00a0showed that both parties reincarnate a national identity that carries the heritage of the mythical past, which acts as a shield to protect the nation against growing multiculturalist identities and ideologies of the global economy. On that note, the AKP and FN construct a glorious past of the nation, a crisis-driven present which allows them to detect and frame imaginary enemies of the nation, and an imaginary future of the national community.\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

\n\n\n\n

\u00a0\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Akdogan, Y. (2004).\u202fAK Parti ve Muhafazakar Demokrasi [AKP and Conservative Democracy]<\/em>. Istanbul: Alfa Yayincilik. \u202f\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Aydin-Duzgit, S. (2016). \u2018De-Europeanisation through Discourse: A Critical Discourse Analysis of AKP\u2019s Election Speeches\u2019 in\u202fSouth European Society and Politics,\u202f<\/em>21:1, pp. 45-48.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Gest, J., Reny, T., Mayer, J. (2017). \u2018Roots of the Radical Right: Nostalgic Deprivation in the United States and Britain\u2019 in\u202fComparative Political Studies<\/em>, Vol. 51, pp. 1694-1719.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Kaya, A., Robert, M. V., & Tecmen, A. (2020). Populism in Turkey and France: nativism, multiculturalism and Euroskepticism.\u202fTurkish Studies<\/em>,\u202f21<\/em>(3),\u00a0pp.\u00a0361-391.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Keyman, F. (2008). \u2018Introduction: Modernity and Democracy in Turkey\u2019 in\u202fRemaking Turkey: Globalization, Alternative Modernities and Democracies<\/em>, Fuat E. Keyman ed. Oxford: Lexington.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Lipiansky, E.D. (1991).\u202fFrench identity: representations, myths, ideologies.<\/em>\u202fHarvard University Press.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Mondon, A. (2014). \u2018The Front National in the Twenty-First Century: From Pariah to Republican Contender?\u2019 in\u202fModern & Contemporary France<\/em>, Vol. 22, pp. 301-320.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Ozpek, B.B., Yasar, N.T. (2018). \u2018Populism and foreign policy in Turkey under AKP rule\u2019 in\u202fTurkish Studies<\/em>, Vol. 19, pp, 198-216.\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Seitz, L. (2020). \u2018France Deserve to be Free\u2019: Constituting Frenchness in Marine Le Pen\u2019s National Front\/National Rally.<\/em>\u202fColorado State University.\u202fhttps:\/\/mountainscholar.org\/bitstream\/handle\/10217\/211987\/Seitz_colostate_0053N_16082.pdf?sequence=1<\/a>\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Symons, E.K. (2017). \u2018The New National Front is the same as the Old National Front\u2019 in Foreign Policy, available at\u202fhttps:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2017\/04\/11\/the-holocaust-denying-vichy-celebrating-heart-of-the-national-front\/<\/a>\u202f\u00a0<\/p>\n\n\n\n

Yabanci, B. (2016). \u2018Populism as the problem child of democracy: the AKP\u2019s enduring appeal and the use of meso-level actors\u2019 in\u202fSoutheast European and Black Sea Studies,<\/em>\u202fVol. 16, pp, 591-617.\u00a0<\/p>","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

\u201cThere is a revolution going on, a revolution of nations, actually, it is the great return of nations, and the great return…<\/p>","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":1761,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"give_campaign_id":0,"_uag_custom_page_level_css":"","footnotes":""},"categories":[28],"tags":[],"class_list":{"0":"post-1759","1":"post","2":"type-post","3":"status-publish","4":"format-standard","5":"has-post-thumbnail","7":"category-opinion-eng"},"uagb_featured_image_src":{"full":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled.png",1024,1024,false],"thumbnail":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled-150x150.png",150,150,true],"medium":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled-300x300.png",300,300,true],"medium_large":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled-768x768.png",768,768,true],"large":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled-1024x1024.png",1024,1024,true],"1536x1536":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled.png",1024,1024,false],"2048x2048":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled.png",1024,1024,false],"trp-custom-language-flag":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled.png",12,12,false],"inhype-blog-thumb":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled.png",694,694,false],"inhype-blog-thumb-grid":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled.png",360,360,false],"inhype-blog-thumb-widget":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled.png",180,180,false],"inhype-blog-thumb-masonry":["https:\/\/assedel.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2021\/06\/Copy-of-Copy-of-Untitled.png",360,360,false]},"uagb_author_info":{"display_name":"assedel","author_link":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/author\/assedel\/"},"uagb_comment_info":0,"uagb_excerpt":"\u201cThere is a revolution going on, a revolution of nations, actually, it is the great return of nations, and the great return...","amp_enabled":true,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1759","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=1759"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1759\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1762,"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/1759\/revisions\/1762"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/1761"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=1759"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=1759"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/assedel.org\/fr\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=1759"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}